In Re: SGL Carbon Corp, [ Official Comm. of Unsec. Cred. vs. Nucor Corp] by unknown
1999 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
12-29-1999 
In Re: SGL Carbon Corp, [ Official Comm. of Unsec. Cred. vs. 
Nucor Corp] 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1999 
Recommended Citation 
"In Re: SGL Carbon Corp, [ Official Comm. of Unsec. Cred. vs. Nucor Corp]" (1999). 1999 Decisions. 332. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1999/332 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1999 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed December 29, 1999 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
Nos. 99-5319 & 99-5382 
 
IN RE: SGL CARBON CORPORATION, Debtor 
 
OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED CREDITORS, 
       Appellant at No. 99-5319 
 
v. 
 
NUCOR CORPORATION; 
NUCOR-YAMATO STEEL COMPANY, 
       Appellants at No. 99-5382 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
D.C. Civil Action No. 98-cv-02779 
(Honorable Joseph J. Farnan, Jr.) 
 
Argued July 29, 1999 
 
Before: SCIRICA and McKEE, Circuit Judges, 
and BROTMAN, District Judge* 
 
(Filed: December 29, 1999) 
 
 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
* The Honorable Stanley S. Brotman, United States District Judge for the 
District of New Jersey, sitting by designation. 
  
       PHILIP BENTLEY, ESQUIRE 
        (ARGUED) 
       KENNETH H. ECKSTEIN, ESQUIRE 
       Kramer, Levin, Naftalis & Frankel 
       919 Third Avenue 
       New York, New York 10022 
 
       TERESA K.D. CURRIER, ESQUIRE 
       Duane, Morris & Heckscher 
       1201 Market Street, Suite 1500 
       P.O. Box 195 
       Wilmington, Delaware 19899 
 
        Attorneys for Appellant/Cross- 
        Appellee, Official Committee of 
        Unsecured Creditors 
 
       JAMES J. RODGERS, ESQUIRE 
        (ARGUED) 
       Dilworth, Paxson, Kalish 
        & Kauffman 
       1735 Market Street 
       3200 The Mellon Bank Center 
       Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103 
 
       MICHAEL D. RIDBERG, ESQUIRE 
       Ridberg, Press & Sherbill 
       Three Bethesda Metro Center, 
        Suite 650 
       Bethesda, Maryland 20814 
 
        Attorneys for Appellants, 
        Nucor Corporation; Nucor-Yamato 
        Steel Company 
 
                                2 
  
       GEORGE J. WADE, ESQUIRE 
        (ARGUED) 
       Shearman & Sterling 
       599 Lexington Avenue 
       New York, New York 10022 
 
       LAURA D. JONES, ESQUIRE 
       Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor 
       P.O. Box 391 
       Rodney Square North, 11th Floor 
       Wilmington, Delaware 19899-0391 
 
        Attorneys for Appellee, 
       SGL Carbon Corporation 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
The issue on appeal is whether, on the facts of this case, 
a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition filed by a financially 
healthy company in the face of potentially significant civil 
antitrust liability complies with the requirements of the 
Bankruptcy Code. In this case, the Official Committee of 
Unsecured Creditors of SGL Carbon Corporation appeals 
the District Court's order denying its motion to dismiss SGL 
Carbon's Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition on bad faith 
grounds. 
 
This case also presents the threshold issue whether we 
will adopt a "good faith" requirement for Chapter 11 
petitions. We will. After undertaking the fact intensive 
analysis inherent in the good faith determination, we 
conclude that SGL Carbon's Chapter 11 petition lacks a 
valid reorganizational purpose and, therefore, lacks the 
requisite good faith. We will reverse. 
 
I. 
 
SGL Carbon is a Delaware corporation that manufactures 
and sells graphite electrodes used in steel production.1 In 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. SGL Carbon Corp. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of SGL 
Aktiengesellschaft (SGL AG), a German corporation. SGL Carbon Corp. is 
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1997, the United States Department of Justice commenced 
an investigation of alleged price-fixing by graphite electrode 
manufacturers, including the SGL Carbon Group.2 Soon 
thereafter, various steel producers filed class action 
antitrust lawsuits in the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against SGL Carbon 
and other graphite electrode manufacturers. The District 
Court consolidated the cases into a single class action and 
certified a class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) consisting of 
all United States purchasers of graphite electrodes between 
1992 and 1997. Many class members opted out of the class 
before the November 28, 1998 opt-out deadline and 
subsequently filed or threatened to file separate antitrust 
lawsuits. Since the class certification, six complaints have 
been filed in federal district court and one complaint has 
been filed in a Canadian court. 
 
In June 1998, SGL Carbon's German parent SGL AG 
recorded a charge in Deutschmarks of approximately $240 
million as its "best estimate" of the SGL Carbon Group's3 
potential liability in the criminal and civil antitrust litigation.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
comprised of two "business units"--the North American Carbon/ 
Graphite unit, which is of primary interest here, and the specialty 
carbon unit. 
 
2. In May 1999, SGL AG (SGL Carbon's parent) and its chairman Robert 
Koehler each pled guilty to several criminal antitrust charges and agreed 
to pay fines of $135 million and $10 million respectively. It is important 
to note that the guilty pleas and the payment of the criminal fines by the 
parent company occurred after the filing of the Chapter 11 petition and 
the District Court's denial of the motion to dismiss. 
 
3. According to the stipulated facts, "[t]he SGL CARBON Group has more 
than 28 manufacturing facilities in 10 countries and has sales in more 
than 90 countries. The SGL CARBON Group is the largest manufacturer 
of carbon and graphite products in the world and the second largest 
manufacturer of graphite electrodes. The North American 
Carbon/Graphite Business Unit is one of two business units of the 
Debtor. The North American Carbon/Graphite Business Unit operates 
only in the United States and Canada." Stipulation of Facts, No. 98B- 
2779, at *1. It is important to note, therefore, that SGL Carbon Corp. is 
only one part of the SGL Carbon Group. 
 
4. Although the record does not reflect the amount by which the $240 
million reserve was increased by SGL AG subsequent to its guilty plea 
and accompanying fine, the parties have indicated that the reserve was 
increased. It is significant that, at the time of SGL Carbon's Chapter 11 
petition, the $240 million reserve was in place and untouched. 
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On December 16, 1998, at the direction of SGL AG, SGL 
Carbon filed a voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in 
the United States District Court for Delaware. In SGL 
Carbon's Disclosure Statement, in a section addressing 
"Factors Leading to [the] Chapter 11 Filing," SGL Carbon 
only discussed the antitrust litigation. The bankruptcy 
filing contained a proposed reorganization plan under 
which only one type of creditor would be required to accept 
less than full cash payment for its account, namely the 
antitrust plaintiffs who obtained judgments against SGL 
Carbon. Under the plan, potential antitrust judgment 
creditors would receive credits against future purchases of 
SGL Carbon's product valid for 30 months following the 
plan's confirmation. The proposed plan also bars any 
claimant from bringing an action against SGL Carbon's 
affiliates, including its parent SGL AG, "based on, relating 
to, arising out of, or in any way connected with" their 
claims against SGL Carbon. 
 
The next day, on December 17, in a press release, SGL 
Carbon explained it had filed for bankruptcy "to protect 
itself against excessive demands made by plaintiffs in civil 
antitrust litigation and in order to achieve an expeditious 
resolution of the claims against it." The press release also 
stated: 
 
       SGL CARBON Corporation believes that in its case 
       Chapter 11 protection provides the most effective and 
       efficient means for resolving the civil antitrust claims. 
       . . . 
 
       . . . . 
 
        "SGL CARBON Corporation is financially healthy," 
       said Wayne T. Burgess, SGL CARBON Corporation's 
       president. "If we did not face [antitrust] claims for such 
       excessive amounts, we would not have had to file for 
       Chapter 11. We expect to continue our normal 
       business operations." 
 
       . . . . 
 
        However, because certain plaintiffs continue to make 
       excessive and unreasonable demands, SGL CARBON 
       Corporation believes the prospects of ever reaching a 
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       commercially practicable settlement with them are 
       remote. After much consideration, SGL CARBON 
       Corporation determined that the most appropriate 
       course of action to address the situation without 
       harming its business was to voluntarily file for chapter 
       11 protection. 
 
       . . . . 
 
Contemporaneous with the press release, SGL AG 
Chairman Robert Koehler conducted a telephone conference 
call with securities analysts, stating that SGL Carbon was 
"financially healthier" than before and denying the antitrust 
litigation was "starting to have a material impact on [SGL 
Carbon's] ongoing operations in the sense that . . . [it was] 
starting to lose market share." He also stated that SGL 
Carbon's Chapter 11 petition was "fairly innovative [and] 
creative" because "usually Chapter 11 is used as protection 
against serious insolvency or credit problems, which is not 
the case [with SGL Carbon's petition]." 
 
Two weeks after SGL Carbon filed its petition and issued 
the press release, the United States Trustee formed a nine 
member Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors. Eight of 
the committee members are antitrust plaintiffs; two of the 
eight serve as class representatives and the other six have 
opted out of the class.5 In January 1999, the Committee 
filed a motion to dismiss SGL Carbon's bankruptcy petition 
on the grounds that it was a "litigation tactic designed to 
frustrate the prosecution of the civil antitrust claims 
pending against [SGL Carbon] and preserve[SGL Carbon's] 
equity from these claims." In re SGL Carbon Corp., 233 B.R. 
285, 287 (D. Del. 1999). 
 
The District Court held a hearing on the motion on 
February 17, 1999.6 Neither side presented witnesses. The 
evidence was entirely documentary or deposition testimony, 
including the deposition of SGL Carbon's Vice President 
Theodore Breyer, who directs the company's graphite 
electrode business in the United States. In his deposition, 
Breyer testified that SGL Carbon was financially healthy, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The ninth Committee member is a trade creditor--Conoco, Inc. 
 
6. SGL Carbon's case was not referred to a bankruptcy court. 
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having no overdue debts when it filed its Chapter 11 
petition. Breyer stated that he recommended filing for 
bankruptcy because he believed SGL Carbon "could not 
expeditiously settle with the [antitrust] plaintiffs" absent 
Chapter 11 protection. Acknowledging that bankruptcy 
protection was the "sole reason" SGL AG's Executive 
Committee had authorized the Chapter 11 petition, Breyer 
testified that he believed filing for Chapter 11 would 
"change the negotiating platform" with plaintiffs and 
"increase the pressure on . . . plaintiffs to settle." 
 
The District Court denied the Committee's motion to 
dismiss on April 23, 1999 assuming, without deciding, that 
11 U.S.C. S 1112(b) imposes a duty of good faith upon 
bankruptcy petitioners. It further assumed this duty 
requires the proposed reorganization to further what it 
characterized as Chapter 11's purpose: " `to restructure a 
business's finances so that it may continue to operate, 
provide its employees with jobs, pay its creditors and 
produce a return for its stockholders.' " SGL Carbon Corp., 
233 B.R. at 288 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 595 (1977) reprinted 
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6179). The court made nofindings 
that SGL Carbon filed for bankruptcy for reasons other 
than to improve its negotiating position with plaintiffs. But 
the court concluded the petition furthered the purpose of 
Chapter 11 because plaintiffs' litigation was imperiling SGL 
Carbon's operation by distracting its management, was 
potentially ruinous and could eventually force the company 
out of business. The court explained that 
 
       [t]he distractions of the litigation pose a serious threat 
       to the continued successful operations of [SGL 
       Carbon]. Further, the potential liability faced by [SGL 
       Carbon] could very well force it out of business. 
       Consistent with the policies and purposes of Chapter 
       11 which encourage early filing so as to increase the 
       possibility of successful reorganization, the Court will 
       not allow [SGL Carbon] to wait idly by for impending 
       financial and operational ruin, when [SGL Carbon] can 
       take action now to avoid such a consequence. 
 
SGL Carbon Corp., 233 B.R. at 291. 
 
The Committee has appealed. 
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II. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction over this bankruptcy 
case under 28 U.S.C. S 1334(a). We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. S 1291. See In re Brown, 916 F.2d 120, 124 (3d 
Cir. 1990) (holding that order denying motion to dismiss a 
bankruptcy petition is "final" under 28 U.S.C.S 1291). 
 
We have not yet had occasion to decide what standard of 
review to apply to a dismissal of a Chapter 11 petition. 
Consistent with the other courts of appeals to consider the 
issue, we believe this decision is committed to the sound 
discretion of the bankruptcy or district court and will 
review for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Leavitt v. Soto (In 
re Leavitt), 171 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 1999) (reviewing for 
abuse of discretion);7 In re Abijoe Realty Corp., 943 F.2d 
121, 128 (1st Cir. 1991) (same). Mindful that "an abuse of 
discretion exists where the district court's decision rests 
upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant 
conclusion of law, or an improper application of law to 
fact," ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Ed., 84 F.3d 
1471, 1476 (3d Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted), we 
review the findings of fact leading to the decision for clear 
error and exercise plenary review over the court's 
conclusions of law. See First Jersey Nat'l Bank v. Brown (In 
re Brown), 951 F.2d 564, 567 (3d Cir. 1991). See also 
Leavitt, 171 F.3d at 1222 (applying differing standards of 
review to different components of good faith/bad faith 
determination); Abijoe Realty Corp., 943 F.2d at 128 (same). 
 
III. 
 
11 U.S.C. S 1112(b) governs the dismissal or conversion 
of Chapter 11 petitions. It provides in part: 
 
       [T]he court may convert a case under [Chapter 11] to 
       a case under Chapter 7 . . . or may dismiss a case 
       under this chapter, whichever is in the best interest of 
       creditors and the estate, for cause . . . . 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Although In re Leavitt addressed a good faith determination regarding 
a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition, there is no significant distinction 
between Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 petitions with respect to the 
appropriate standard of review. 
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11 U.S.C. S 1112(b). 
 
The statute provides for dismissal for cause, if it is in the 
best interest of the creditors and the estate. Conversion is 
not an option here.8 We will determine whether there is 
cause for dismissal. 
 
A. 
 
The threshold issue is whether Chapter 11 petitions may 
be dismissed for "cause" under 11 U.S.C. S 1112(b) if not 
filed in good faith. Although we have not squarely 
addressed this issue, we implied in First Jersey Nat'l Bank 
v. Brown (In re Brown), 951 F.2d 564 (3d Cir. 1991), that 
Chapter 11 imposes a good-faith obligation. In Brown, we 
considered evidence of bad faith in reviewing the dismissal 
of a Chapter 11 petition, but concluded "the evidence . . . 
of bad faith . . . was not strong enough for us to say that 
it was established as a matter of law." Id. at 572. Because 
Brown focused on the adequacy of the record for making a 
good faith/bad faith determination, we did not expressly 
address whether "bad faith" constituted cause for 
dismissal. In this case, we make clear what we implied in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. In other circumstances, deciding a motion to dismiss under 11 U.S.C. 
S 1112(b), may involve a two-step process offirst deciding whether there 
is cause and then deciding whether to dismiss or convert. See Rollex v. 
Associated Materials, Inc. (In re Superior Siding & Window, Inc.), 14 F.3d 
240, 242 (4th Cir. 1994). That procedure is understandable when 
applied to the statutory bases for finding cause that turn on the 
impossibility of Chapter 11 relief. See 11 U.S.C. S 1112(b). The same is 
not necessarily true in all bad faith cases. Two forms of bad faith can 
make a Chapter 11 petition objectionable. One involves either pre- or 
post-petition misconduct by the debtor. In such cases, where the debtor 
otherwise properly belongs in bankruptcy, dismissal need not always 
follow from a finding of bad faith stemming from such misconduct. See 
7 Collier on Bankruptcy 1112-70 (15th ed. 1996) ("[I]n many 
circumstances, the court might be better advised to address the bad 
conduct of the debtor (or some other party) in a manner other than 
through dismissal of the proceedings."). In bad faith cases involving the 
filing of a petition that is an abuse of the bankruptcy process, however, 
S 1112(b)'s conversion/dismissal choice is inappropriate. The proponent 
of an abusive petition does not belong in bankruptcy so it is unnecessary 
to ask whether dismissal or conversion is in the interest of the 
creditors. 
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Brown--Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions are subject to 
dismissal under 11 U.S.C. S 1112(b) unlessfiled in good 
faith. 
 
Four factors guide our adoption of a good faith standard 
--the permissive language of S 1112(b), viewed in light of its 
legislative history; the decisions of our sister courts of 
appeals; the equitable nature of bankruptcy; and the 
purposes underpinning Chapter 11. 
 
We begin with 11 U.S.C. S 1112(b), which allows the 
court to dismiss or convert a Chapter 11 petition for cause 
 
       including-- 
 
        (1) continuing loss to or diminution of the es tate 
       and absence of a reasonable likelihood of 
       rehabilitation; 
 
        (2) inability to effectuate a plan; 
 
        (3) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is 
       prejudicial to the creditors; 
 
        (4) failure to propose a plan [of reorganiz ation] 
       within any time fixed by the court; 
 
        (5) denial of confirmation of every proposed  plan 
       and denial of a request made for additional time for 
       filing another plan or a modification of a plan; 
 
        (6) revocation of an order of confirmation u nder 
       section 1144 of this title, and denial of confirmation 
       of another plan or a modified plan under section 
       1129 of this title; 
 
        (7) inability to effectuate substantial 
       consummation of a confirmed plan; 
 
        (8) material default by the debtor with respec t to a 
       confirmed plan; 
 
        (9) termination of a plan by reason of the 
       occurrence of a condition specified in the plan; or 
 
        (10) nonpayment of any fees or charges require d 
       under chapter 123 of title 28. 
 
11 U.S.C. S1112(b). As many courts and commentators 
have noted, this language neither requires nor prohibits 
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imposition of a "good faith" requirement on Chapter 11 
petitions. But we have noted the provision that"cause" 
"includ[es]" the ten enumerated factors strongly suggests 
those factors are not exhaustive and that a court may 
consider whether other facts and circumstances qualify as 
"cause." See Brown, 951 F.2d at 572; 7 Collier on 
Bankruptcy at 1112-20. That interpretation of S 1112(b) is 
strengthened by the statute's legislative history, which 
provides in part: 
 
       [The] list [contained in S 1112(b)] is not exhaustive. The 
       court will be able to consider other factors as they 
       arise, and to use its equitable powers to reach an 
       appropriate result in individual cases. 
 
H.R.Rep. No. 595, at 405, reprinted in 1978 U.S.S.C.A.N. 
5963, 6362. The Bankruptcy Code's rules of construction, 
which provide that "include" and "including" are not 
limiting terms, also support an expansive reading of 
S 1112(b). See 11 U.S.C. S 102(3). Section 1112(b), by its 
terms, therefore, does not preclude consideration of 
unenumerated factors in determining "cause." 
 
We also note the courts of appeals that have considered 
the issue have held that the absence of good faith 
constitutes "cause" to dismiss a Chapter 11 petition under 
S 1112(b). See, e.g., Trident Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (In re Trident Assocs. Ltd. 
Partnership), 52 F.3d 127, 130 (6th Cir. 1995); Marsch v. 
Marsch (In re Marsch), 36 F.3d 825, 828 (9th Cir. 1994); 
Humble Place Joint Ventures v. Foray (In re Humble Place 
Joint Venture), 936 F.2d 814, 816 (5th Cir. 1991); First Nat'l 
Bank of Sioux City v. Kerr (In re Kerr), 908 F.2d 400, 404 
(8th Cir. 1990); Phoenix Piccadilly, Ltd. v. Life Ins. Co. (In re 
Phoenix Piccadilly, Ltd.), 849 F.2d 1393, 1394 (11th Cir. 
1988). In addition, several other courts of appeals have 
concluded that Chapter 11 imposes a general good faith 
requirement under which petitions can be dismissed for 
bad faith. See, e.g., C-TC 9th Ave. Partnership v. Norton Co. 
(In re C-TC 9th Ave. Partnership), 113 F.3d 1304 (2d Cir. 
1997); Carolin Corp. v. Miller, 886 F.2d 693, 698 (4th Cir. 
1989); Connell v. Coastal Cable T.V., Inc. (In re Coastal 
Cable T.V., Inc.), 709 F.2d 762, 764 (1st Cir. 1983) (Breyer, 
J.). Numerous district and bankruptcy courts have reached 
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the same conclusion under either or both approaches. See 
Carlos J. Cuevas, Good Faith and Chapter 11: Standard 
that Should Be Employed to Dismiss Bad Faith Chapter 11 
Cases, 60 Tenn. L. Rev. 525 (1993).9  
 
The "good faith" requirement for Chapter 11 petitioners 
has strong roots in equity. The court in In re Victory 
Construction Co., Inc., in first articulating the good faith 
requirement under the current Bankruptcy Code, 
highlighted the equitable nature of the doctrine when it 
explained: 
 
       Review and analysis of [the bankruptcy laws and 
       relevant cases] disclose a common theme and objective 
       [underlying the reorganization provisions]: avoidance of 
       the consequences of economic dismemberment and 
       liquidation, and the preservation of ongoing values in a 
       manner which does equity and is fair to rights and 
       interests of the parties affected. But the perimeters of 
       this potential mark the borderline between fulfillment 
       and perversion; between accomplishing the objectives 
       of rehabilitation and reorganization, and the use of 
       these statutory provisions to destroy and undermine 
       the legitimate rights and interests of those intended to 
       benefit by this statutory policy. That borderline is 
       patrolled by courts of equity, armed with the doctrine 
       of "good faith" . . . . 
 
9 B.R. 549, 558 (Bankr. C.D. Calif. 1981) order stayed 
Hadley v. Victory Construction Co., Inc. (In re Victory 
Construction Co., Inc.), 9 B.R. 570 (Bankr. C.D. Calif. 1981). 
A debtor who attempts to garner shelter under the 
Bankruptcy Code, therefore, must act in conformity with 
the Code's underlying principles. See Little Creek Dev. Co. 
v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp. (In re Little Creek Dev. 
Co.), 779 F.2d 1068, 1076 (5th Cir. 1986) ("[A] good faith 
standard protects the jurisdictional integrity of the 
bankruptcy courts by rendering their equitable weapons 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. We need not dwell on the fine distinctions between the two closely 
related approaches. See 7 Collier on Bankruptcy at 1112-62-1112-64. 
Despite analytic differences, the conclusion of every court of appeals to 
address the issue is clear--Chapter 11 petitions must be filed in good 
faith or they are subject to dismissal. 
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. . . available only to those debtors and creditors with `clean 
hands.' "); see also 7 Collier on Bankruptcy at 1112-68 
("Another basic underpinning of the good faith doctrine is 
the equitable concept of `clean hands.' As a general matter, 
bankruptcy relief is equitable in nature, and, as a general 
rule, equitable remedies are not available to any party who 
fails to act in an equitable fashion."). 
 
Finally, we believe a good faith requirement is supported 
by the purposes underlying Chapter 11. As the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted, 
 
       [A good faith standard] furthers the balancing process 
       between the interests of debtors and creditors which 
       characterizes so many provisions of the bankruptcy 
       laws and is necessary to legitimize the delay and costs 
       imposed upon parties to a bankruptcy. Requirement of 
       good faith prevents abuse of the bankruptcy process by 
       debtors whose overriding motive is to delay creditors 
       without benefitting them in any way . . . . 
 
In re Little Creek, 779 F.2d at 1072; see also Carolin, 886 
F.2d at 698 (stating that court's ability to impose good faith 
requirement is "indispensable to proper accomplishment of 
the basic purposes of Chapter 11 protection"). 
 
After considering the language of S 1112(b), its legislative 
history, the decisions of other courts of appeals, the 
equitable nature of bankruptcy proceedings, and the 
purposes behind Chapter 11, we conclude a Chapter 11 
petition is subject to dismissal for "cause" under 11 U.S.C. 
S 1112(b) unless it is filed in good faith. 
 
B. 
 
Having determined that S 1112(b) imposes a good-faith 
requirement on Chapter 11 petitions, we consider whether 
SGL Carbon's Chapter 11 petition was filed in good faith.10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Once at issue, the burden falls upon the bankruptcy petitioner to 
establish that the petition has been filed in"good faith." See, e.g., In 
re 
Fox, 232 B.R. 229, 233 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1999); Stage I Land Co. v. United 
States, 71 B.R. 225, 229 (D. Minn. 1986). See also 7 Collier on 
Bankruptcy at 1112-53 ("[I]f the issue is whether the petition was filed 
in good faith, the burden rests on the petitioner."). 
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The requisite fact intensive inquiry requires determining 
where SGL Carbon's petition falls along the spectrum 
ranging from the clearly acceptable to the patently abusive. 
We first review the District Court's findings of fact and then 
examine the totality of facts and circumstances to 
determine whether they support a finding of good faith. See 
In re Trident, 52 F.3d at 131; In re Marsch, 36 F.3d at 829; 
In re Laguna, 30 F.3d at 738. 
 
i. 
 
As discussed in part I, the District Court found SGL 
Carbon's Chapter 11 petition was filed in good faith for two 
reasons: first, because the distractions caused by the 
antitrust litigation "posed a serious threat to[SGL 
Carbon's] continued successful operations," and second, 
because the litigation might result in a judgment that could 
cause the company "financial and operational ruin," SGL 
was required to file when it did. SGL Carbon, 233 B.R. at 
291. Although mindful of the careful consideration given by 
the able District Court, we believe each of thesefindings of 
fact was clearly erroneous.11 
 
Although there is some evidence that defending against 
the antitrust litigation occupied some officers' time, there is 
no evidence this "distraction" posed a "serious threat" to 
the company's operational well being. At his deposition, 
Theodore Breyer12 testified the antitrust litigation consumed 
a significant portion of his time. But Breyer also noted the 
Carbon/Graphite Business Unit had met all of itsfinancial 
targets during the nine months preceding filing. 
Additionally, Breyer testified that only his business unit 
was heavily involved in the antitrust litigation, recognizing 
that any management distraction effecting the rest of SGL 
Carbon resulted from the bankruptcy filing and not the 
antitrust litigation. As noted, SGL AG and SGL Carbon 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Although we conclude these findings were clearly erroneous, we do 
not hold that under the proper circumstances managerial distraction 
and other litigation harms may not constitute factors contributing to 
good faith. 
 
12. As noted, Breyer is the Vice President in charge of SGL Carbon's 
North American Carbon/Graphite Business Unit. 
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officers insisted the company was financially healthy 
despite the litigation. In addition, SGL AG's Chairman 
denied that the litigation was having a "material negative 
impact on [SGL Carbon's] operations." In light of all the 
evidence, we believe the District Court's finding to the 
contrary is mistaken. See United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 
333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). 
 
We also find clearly erroneous that SGL Carbon's 
Chapter 11 petition was filed at the appropriate time to 
avoid the possibility of a significant judgment that "could 
very well force [SGL Carbon] out of business." There is no 
evidence that the possible antitrust judgments might force 
SGL Carbon out of business. To the contrary, the record is 
replete with evidence of SGL Carbon's economic strength. 
At the time of filing, SGL Carbon's assets had a stipulated 
book value of $400 million, only $100,000 of which was 
encumbered. On the date of the petition, SGL Carbon had 
$276 million in fixed and non-disputed liabilities. Of those 
liabilities, only $26 million were held by outsiders as the 
remaining liabilities were either owed to or guaranteed by 
SGL AG. Although SGL Carbon's parent, SGL AG, recorded 
a $240 million charge on its books as "its best estimate of 
the potential liability and expenses of the SGL Carbon 
Group in connection with all civil and criminal antitrust 
matters," SGL Carbon is only one part of the SGL Carbon 
Group covered by the reserve. Furthermore, at the time 
SGL Carbon filed its petition, that is, before SGL AG paid 
its $135 million criminal fine, the $240 million reserve was 
untouched. In documents accompanying its petition, SGL 
Carbon estimated the liquidation value of the antitrust 
claims at $54 million. In contrast, no evidence was 
presented with respect to the amount sought by the 
antitrust plaintiffs beyond SGL Carbon's repeated 
characterization of their being "unreasonable." 
 
Whether or not SGL Carbon faces a potentially crippling 
antitrust judgment, it is incorrect to conclude it had to file 
when it did. As noted, SGL Carbon faces no immediate 
financial difficulty. All the evidence shows that management 
repeatedly asserted the company was financially healthy at 
the time of the filing. Although the District Court believed 
the litigation might result in a judgment causing "financial 
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and operational ruin" we believe that on the facts here, that 
assessment was premature. A Chapter 11 petition would 
impose an automatic stay on all efforts to collect the 
judgment and would allow the company the exclusive right 
to formulate a reorganization plan under which the amount 
of the judgment could be adjusted to allow the company to 
reorganize. SGL Carbon has offered no evidence it could not 
effectively use those protections as the prospect of such a 
judgment became imminent.13 The District Court's finding 
that the petition had to be filed at that particular time to 
avoid financial ruin and therefore was made in good faith is 
clearly contradicted by the evidence. 
 
The District Court was correct in noting that the 
Bankruptcy Code encourages early filing. See SGL Carbon, 
233 B.R. at 291. It is well established that a debtor need 
not be insolvent before filing for bankruptcy protection. See, 
e.g., In re The Bible Speaks, 65 B.R. 415, 424 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 1986); In re Talladega Steaks, Inc., 50 B.R. 42, 44 
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1985). See also Daniel R. Cowans, 
Bankruptcy Law and Practice (7th ed. 1998) 232. It also is 
clear that the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code understood 
the need for early access to bankruptcy relief to allow a 
debtor to rehabilitate its business before it is faced with a 
hopeless situation.14 Such encouragement, however, does 
not open the door to premature filing, nor does it allow for 
the filing of a bankruptcy petition that lacks a valid 
reorganizational purpose. See, e.g., In re Marsch, 36 F.3d at 
838; In re Coastal Cable, 709 F.2d at 764; In re Ravick 
Corp., 106 B.R. 834, 843 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1989). 
 
SGL Carbon, therefore, is correct that the Bankruptcy 
Code does not require specific evidence of insolvency for a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. The Texaco Corporation's use of the bankruptcy protections is 
instructive. See In re Texaco, Inc., 84 B.R. 893 (Bank. S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
Texaco resorted to bankruptcy only after suffering an $11 billion 
judgment. Even saddled with such a large judgment, bankruptcy 
provided Texaco a means of reorganizing and continuing as a going 
concern. 
 
14. See, e.g., Alan N. Resnick, Bankruptcy As A Vehicle for Resolving 
Enterprise-Threatening Mass Tort Liability, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. ____ 
(forthcoming 2000) M12. 
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voluntary Chapter 11 filing. But SGL Carbon cites no case 
holding that petitions filed by financially healthy companies 
cannot be subject to dismissal for cause. At any rate, as we 
explain more fully, SGL Carbon's ability to meet its debts is 
but one of many factors compelling the conclusion it did 
not enter Chapter 11 with a valid reorganizational purpose. 
 
We do not hold that a company cannot file a valid 
Chapter 11 petition until after a massive judgment has 
been entered against it. Courts have allowed companies to 
seek the protections of bankruptcy when faced with 
pending litigation that posed a serious threat to the 
companies' long term viability. See, e.g., Baker v. Latham 
Sparrowbush Assocs. (In re Cohoes Indus. Terminal Inc.), 
931 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1991); In re The Bible Speaks, 65 
B.R. 415 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986); In re Johns-Manville, 36 
B.R. 727 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984). In those cases, however, 
debtors experienced serious financial and/or managerial 
difficulties at the time of filing. In Cohoes, the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit found a good faithfiling, in 
part, because "it [was] clear that Cohoes[the debtor] was 
encountering financial stress at the time it filed its petition 
. . . ." 931 F.2d at 228. In Bible Speaks, pending litigation 
had already had an adverse effect on the debtor'sfinancial 
well being as it was experiencing "a cash flow problem 
which prevent[ed] it from meeting its current obligations," 
compounded by an inability to obtain financing. 65 B.R. at 
426. In Johns-Manville, the debtor was facing significant 
financial difficulties. A growing wave of asbestos-related 
claims forced the debtor to either book a $1.9 billion 
reserve thereby triggering potential default on a $450 
million debt which, in turn, could have forced partial 
liquidation, or file a Chapter 11 petition. See In re Johns- 
Manville, 36 B.R. at 730. Large judgments had already been 
entered against Johns-Manville and the prospect loomed of 
tens of thousands of asbestos health-related suits over the 
course of 20-30 years.15 See id. at 729. See also Sandrea 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. A large number of pending or potential claims also contributed to two 
other mass tort related bankruptcy petitions. The 1985 bankruptcy 
petition of the A.H. Robins Company came only after"the Company had 
settled 9,238 claims for approximately $530,000,000" and "still faced 
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Friedman, Note, Manville: Good Faith Reorganization or 
"Insulated" Bankruptcy, 12 Hofstra L. Rev. 121 (1983). 
 
For these reasons, SGL Carbon's reliance on those cases 
is misplaced. The mere possibility of a future need to file, 
without more, does not establish that a petition wasfiled in 
"good faith." See, e.g., In re Cohoes Indus. Terminal Inc., 
931 F.2d at 228 ("Although a debtor need not be in 
extremis in order to file [a Chapter 11] petition, it must, at 
least, face such financial difficulty that, if it did not file at 
that time, it could anticipate the need to file in the future."). 
SGL Carbon, by its own account, and by all objective 
indicia, experienced no financial difficulty at the time of 
filing nor any significant managerial distraction. Although 
SGL Carbon may have to file for bankruptcy in the future, 
such an attenuated possibility standing alone is not 
sufficient to establish the good faith of its present petition. 
 
ii. 
 
We also consider whether other evidence establishes the 
good faith of SGL Carbon's petition, that is, whether the 
totality of facts and circumstances support a finding of 
good faith. Courts have not been unanimous about what 
constitutes "good faith" in the Chapter 11filing context. 
See, e.g., In re Trident, 52 F.3d at 131 (setting forth eight 
factors for courts to consider); In re Marsch, 36 F.3d at 
828-29 (describing different approaches); In re Kerr, 908 
F.2d at 404 (defining "bad faith" as "a pattern of 
concealment, evasion, and direct violations of the Code or 
court order which clearly establishes an improper motive 
. . . ."); Carolin, 886 F.2d at 700-02 (examining approaches 
of other courts and holding a petition lacks good faith if 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
over five thousand pending cases in state and federal court." In re A.H. 
Robins, 89 B.R. 555, 557 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988). Similarly, at the time 
it filed for bankruptcy Dow Corning Corporation faced 440,000 potential 
claimants which had resulted in the filing of more than "19,000 
individual silicone-gel breast implant lawsuits and at least 45 putative 
silicone-gel breast implant class actions." In re Dow Corning Corp., 211 
B.R. 545, 553 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997). See also Richard L. Marcus & 
Edward F. Sherman, Complex Litigation (3d ed. 1998) 205-07. 
 
                                18 
  
reorganization is objectively futile and if petitioner displays 
subjective bad faith); In re Phoenix Piccadilly , 849 F.2d at 
1394 (noting that courts may consider "any factors which 
evidence `an intent to abuse the judicial process and the 
purposes of the reorganization provisions' or . . . factors 
which evidence that the petition was filed `to delay or 
frustrate the legitimate efforts of secured creditors to 
enforce their rights' " (citations omitted)); In re Little Creek 
Dev. Co., 779 F.2d at 1072-73 (5th Cir. 1986) (instructing 
bankruptcy courts to consider "the debtor's financial 
condition, motives, and the local financial realities"). See 
also Cuevas, supra, at 529 (noting different approaches). 
 
Despite those differing approaches, several cases hold 
that a Chapter 11 petition is not filed in good faith unless 
it serves a valid reorganizational purpose. See, e.g., In re 
Marsch, 36 F.3d at 828; In re Coastal Cable, 709 F.2d at 
764 (stating that there must be "some relation" between 
filing and the "reorganization-related purposes that 
[Chapter 11] was designed to serve"); In re Ravick Corp., 
106 B.R. 834, 843 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1989). Similarly, because 
filing a Chapter 11 petition merely to obtain tactical 
litigation advantages is not within "the legitimate scope of 
the bankruptcy laws," In re Marsch, 36 F.3d at 828, courts 
have typically dismissed Chapter 11 petitions under these 
circumstances as well. See id.; In re Argus Group 1700, Inc., 
206 B.R. 757, 765-66 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Furness v. Lilienfield, 
35 B.R. 1006, 1013 (D. Md. 1983) ("The Bankruptcy 
provisions are intended to benefit those in genuine financial 
distress. They are not intended to be used as a mechanism 
to orchestrate pending litigation."); In re HBA East, Inc., 87 
B.R. 248, 259-60 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988) ("As a general rule 
where, as here, the timing of the filing of a Chapter 11 
petition is such that there can be no doubt that the 
primary, if not sole, purpose of the filing was a litigation 
tactic, the petition may be dismissed as not beingfiled in 
good faith."); In re Martin, 51 B.R. 490, 495 (Bankr. M.D. 
Fla. 1985). The In re Marsch Court articulated the 
relationship between the good faith determination and the 
dismissal of petitions filed merely for tactical advantage: 
 
       The term "good faith" is somewhat misleading. Though 
       it suggests that the debtor's subjective intent is 
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       determinative, this is not the case. Instead, the"good 
       faith" filing requirement encompasses several, distinct 
       equitable limitations that courts have placed on 
       Chapter 11 filings. Courts have implied such 
       limitations to deter filings that seek to achieve 
       objectives outside the legitimate scope of the 
       bankruptcy laws. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. S 1112(b), 
       courts have dismissed cases filed for a variety of 
       tactical reasons unrelated to reorganization. 
 
In re Marsch, 36 F.3d at 828 (citations omitted). 
 
It is easy to see why courts have required Chapter 11 
petitioners to act within the scope of the bankruptcy laws 
to further a valid reorganizational purpose. Chapter 11 
vests petitioners with considerable powers--the automatic 
stay, the exclusive right to propose a reorganization plan, 
the discharge of debts, etc.--that can impose significant 
hardship on particular creditors. When financially troubled 
petitioners seek a chance to remain in business, the 
exercise of those powers is justified. But this is not so when 
a petitioner's aims lie outside those of the Bankruptcy 
Code. See United Sav. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest 
Assocs., Ltd. (In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd.), 
808 F.2d 363, 373 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc), aff'd, 484 
U.S. 365 (1988) (stating that if Chapter 11 plan does not 
have a rehabilitative purpose, the "statutory provisions 
designed to accomplish the reorganizational objectives 
become destructive of the legitimate rights and interests of 
creditors"); In re Little Creek, 779 F.2d at 1072 (explaining 
that Chapter 11 powers should be given only to debtors 
with "clean hands"); Furness, 35 B.R. at 1009 ("Chapter 11 
was designed to give those teetering on the verge of a fatal 
financial plummet an opportunity to reorganize on solid 
ground and try again, not to give profitable enterprises an 
opportunity to evade contractual or other liabilities."); see 
also 7 Collier on Bankruptcy at 1112-22 (stating that 
dismissal is appropriate when costs of Chapter 11 are not 
justified). 
 
Courts, therefore, have consistently dismissed Chapter 
11 petitions filed by financially healthy companies with no 
need to reorganize under the protection of Chapter 11. See 
In re Marsch, 36 F.3d at 828-29; In re Argus Group 1700, 
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206 B.R. at 765-66; Furness, 35 B.R. at 1011-13; In re 
Talladega Steaks, Inc., 50 B.R. 42, 44 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 
1985). Those courts have recognized that if a petitioner has 
no need to rehabilitate or reorganize, its petition cannot 
serve the rehabilititative purpose for which Chapter 11 was 
designed. See In re Winshall Settlor's Trust, 758 F.2d 1136, 
1137 (6th Cir. 1985) ("The purpose of Chapter 11 
reorganization is to assist financially distressed business 
enterprises by providing them with breathing space in 
which to return to a viable state."); see also S. Rep. No. 95- 
989, at 9 reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5795 (noting 
that "Chapter 11 deals with the reorganization of a 
financially distressed enterprise . . . "). 
 
The absence of a valid reorganizational purpose 16 and the 
consequent lack of good faith by SGL Carbon is evident 
here. SGL Carbon's financial disclosure documents give no 
indication the company needed to reorganize under Chapter 
11 protection. Prior to filing, SGL Carbon had assets of 
$400 million and liabilities of only $276 million, or a net 
worth of $124 million. In addition, there is no evidence that 
SGL Carbon had difficulty meeting its debts as they came 
due, that it had any overdue debts, or that it had defaulted 
on any debts. Nor is there any evidence that SGL had any 
difficulty raising or borrowing money, or otherwise had 
impaired access to the capital markets. 
 
Statements by SGL Carbon and its officials confirm the 
company did not need to reorganize under Chapter 11. As 
discussed, in a press release issued when SGL Carbonfiled 
its petition, the company's president insisted SGL Carbon 
was "financially healthy" and that its "normal business 
operations" would continue despite bankruptcy. In 
addition, SGL AG's Chairman Robert Koehler stated in a 
conference call with securities analysts that SGL Carbon 
was experiencing "healthy and growing success" and denied 
that the class action antitrust litigation was materially 
interfering with SGL Carbon's operations or its customer 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. By focusing on whether there is a valid reorganization purpose, we 
do not hold that a lack of good faith is limited to this situation. 
Indeed, 
"no list is exhaustive of all the factors which could be relevant when 
analyzing a particular debtor's good faith." In re Laguna, 30 F.3d at 738. 
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relationships. Koehler added that unlike most Chapter 11 
cases, SGL Carbon's petition did not involve "serious 
insolvency or credit problems." SGL Carbon Vice President 
Theodore Breyer acknowledged in his deposition that SGL 
Carbon had no defaults nor any financial distress when it 
filed for Chapter 11. 
 
An examination of the reorganization plan SGL Carbon 
filed simultaneously with its Chapter 11 petition also 
suggests the petition was not motivated by a desire to 
reorganize or rehabilitate SGL Carbon's business. 17 Under 
the proposed plan, all creditors--including SGL Carbon's 
parent SGL AG--other than civil antitrust judgment 
creditors are to be paid in full in cash. Antitrust judgment 
creditors, by contrast, would be required to accept limited- 
time credits to purchase SGL Carbon's products. 18 The 
plan's differing treatment of creditors suggests SGL 
Carbon's petition was not filed to reorganize the company 
but rather to put pressure on antitrust plaintiffs to accept 
the company's settlement terms.19 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. Although the "good faith" of the reorganization plan is not before 
this 
court, the features of the proposed plan help illuminate the lack of good 
faith in the filing. Using the plan to reason backwards concerning SGL 
Carbon's motivations is consistent with the practices of bankruptcy 
courts. As one bankruptcy court has noted: 
 
       Much of the case law on good faith draws heavily upon the time- 
       honored method of analyzing and establishing a nexus between 
       cause and effect. Long a modus habilis not only in bankruptcy but 
       in criminal and tort law and in virtually any legal inquiry where 
       intent is an issue, this sort of posteriori inquiry permits courts 
to 
       work backwards from effect to cause--to reason, that is, that if 
the 
       probable effect of a reorganization plan is to treat unfairly of 
       creditors, then the probable cause of the filing was bad faith. 
 
In re Kahn, 34 B.R. 574, 575 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983). 
 
18. Although the plan is not at issue, we note that an analogous 
arrangement was held inappropriate as a means of resolving an action 
in a nonbankruptcy context. See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck 
Fuel Tank Products Liability, 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
19. Although it is true the proposed plan would be subject to a separate 
"good faith" determination by the bankruptcy court before it could 
implemented, see 11 U.S.C. S 1129(a)(3), that is only appropriate if the 
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Comments made by SGL Carbon and SGL AG officers 
support that view of SGL Carbon's motives for filing for 
Chapter 11. Those officers expressly and repeatedly 
acknowledged Chapter 11 petition was filed solely to gain 
tactical litigation advantages. See, e.g., December 17, 1998 
Press Release; Koehler Conference Call of December 17, 
1998 ("We are [filing] merely . . . because of the excessive 
demands [of litigants]."); Breyer Deposition (filing for 
Chapter 11 would "change the negotiating platform" and 
"increase the pressure on . . . plaintiffs to settle"). In 
addition, under the heading "Factors Leading to the 
Chapter 11 Filing," SGL Carbon's bankruptcy Disclosure 
Statement discusses only the civil antitrust litigation and 
the difficulties it was having in reaching a settlement with 
the remaining plaintiffs. 
 
On appeal, SGL Carbon plays down the litigation tactics 
behind its Chapter 11 petition and instead claims it was 
forced into Chapter 11 by serious economic difficulty 
stemming from the litigation. The company alleges this 
difficulty came in three forms: harmful distraction of its 
management, the possibility that the litigation would result 
in a judgment that "could very well force [SGL Carbon] out 
of business," and harm to its customer relationships with 
plaintiffs. Because we have already concluded thefirst two 
arguments are not supported by the facts, we will address 
only the third. 
 
We are not convinced by SGL Carbon's claim that a 
Chapter 11 filing was necessary because we see no 
evidence the antitrust litigation was significantly harming 
its business relationships with the antitrust plaintiffs. For 
example, none of SGL Carbon's officers stated that any 
customer terminated its purchases from the company 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
bankruptcy petition properly belongs before the bankruptcy court. In a 
case, such as this one, where a debtor attempts to abuse the bankruptcy 
process, proceedings should end well before formal consideration of the 
plan. Cf. In re Metropolitan Realty Corp., 433 F.2d 676, 679 (5th Cir. 
1970) ("As soon as the lack of good faith affirmatively appeared, the 
district court acted properly in dismissing the petition even though the 
plan stage had not been reached."). 
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because of the litigation.20 As noted, SGL AG Chairman 
Koehler denied the litigation was having a material impact 
on SGL Carbon's customer relationships. We note that SGL 
Carbon offered no evidence (testamentary or otherwise) 
from any customer on this issue. It is also significant that 
SGL Carbon's Disclosure Statement, which accompanied its 
petition, does not mention harm to customer relationships. 
Nor did SGL Carbon attempt to explain how filing for 
Chapter 11 would improve its customer relationships. As 
noted, many of those customers are plaintiffs in the 
antitrust litigation. Moreover, the evidence before the 
District Court indicated SGL Carbon's customers eliminated 
their orders only after the Chapter 11 petition wasfiled, 
suggesting it was the petition, rather than the litigation, 
that caused the harm of which the company now 
complains. After sifting through the evidence, the only 
support for SGL Carbon's argument are its conclusory 
allegations. We do not believe those suffice. 
 
SGL Carbon places great emphasis on In re The Bible 
Speaks, 65 B.R. 415 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986), and In re 
Johns-Manville, 36 B.R. 727 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984), two 
bankruptcy court cases relied on by the District Court.21 
After considering those cases, we conclude they are not 
dispositive. 
 
SGL Carbon cites In re The Bible Speaks to support its 
argument that the prospect of a significant litigation 
judgment by itself establishes the good faith of a Chapter 
11 petition. But the litigation in Bible Speaks posed 
substantially different problems than does the antitrust 
litigation here. In Bible Speaks, the bankruptcy court found 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. In fact, SGL Carbon Vice President Breyer testified that he could only 
be certain that one customer had even reduced its purchases from SGL 
Carbon prior to its Chapter 11 petition. Maintaining that a second 
customer may also have reduced its purchases, Breyer could not say 
why either customer had reduced its purchases. Significantly, Breyer 
testified that no customer had terminated its relationship with SGL 
Carbon until after the filing. 
 
21. We note that SGL Carbon has not supported its argument that 
pending litigation establishes the good faith of a Chapter 11 filing with 
any cases from this circuit, or, indeed, any cases other than the 
distinguishable Bible Speaks and Johns-Manville. 
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the litigation had "already produced a significant effect" on 
the debtor; because of the uncertainty surrounding the 
litigation, the debtor was "unable to obtainfinancing." 65 
B.R. at 426. SGL Carbon has not alleged the antitrust 
litigation has had a similar effect and such evidence is 
absent from the record. In addition, the court in Bible 
Speaks found that a significant judgment in the litigation 
would "probably terminate [the debtor's] existence." Id. 
There is no evidence SGL Carbon could not effectively use 
Chapter 11 following a judgment in the antitrust litigation. 
Also, the court found the litigation prevented the debtor in 
Bible Speaks from making "financing [arrangements] or any 
type of long range plans." Id. at 427. SGL Carbon has not 
alleged the antitrust litigation has impeded itsfinancing or 
planning activities; instead, the petitioner has repeatedly 
insisted the litigation has had no material effect on its 
operations. Finally, the court in Bible Speaks found that 
dismissal was not warranted because Chapter 11 was in 
the best interests of the debtor and its creditor. See id. at 
429. There is no such finding in this case. 
 
We also believe reliance on In re Johns-Mansville is 
misplaced. As an initial matter, the Johns-Manville Court 
had a narrow view of what constitutes "good faith." After 
expressing doubt that S 1112(b) imposes a good-faith 
requirement in all Chapter 11 cases, see 36 B.R. at 737, 
the court suggested that a Chapter 11 petition lacks good 
faith only if filed by a creditor-less company formed as a 
sham solely for the purpose of filing a bankruptcy petition, 
by a company that never operated legitimately, or by a 
company wishing to forestall tax liability or deed of trust 
powers. See id. at 737-38. As noted, most of the courts of 
appeals believe other facts and circumstances may evidence 
lack of good faith. 
 
Johns-Mansville is also factually distinguishable. In 
Johns-Manville, the bankruptcy court found the company 
had a "compelling" and "pressing" need to reorganize. Id. at 
730. As we have explained, SGL Carbon has no such need.22 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
22. For example, the Johns-Manville Court noted that the company 
would have had to book a $1.9 billion tort liability reserve had it not 
filed 
for Chapter 11. See id. at 730. This booking would in turn have 
accelerated $450 million in outstanding debt and could have forced 
liquidation. SGL Carbon has not shown the failure tofile for Chapter 11 
would cause it such harm. 
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Prior to the Chapter 11 filing, the Johns Manville plaintiffs 
had recovered nearly $4 million in punitive damages 
against the company. See In re Johns-Manville, 36 B.R. 
743, 746 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1984). The litigation effected by 
SGL's Chapter 11 petition, in contrast, is in its nascent 
stages. Johns-Manville faced "approximately 16,000 
lawsuits pending as of the filing date" with the prospect of 
the "filing of an even more staggering number of suits" over 
the course of 20-30 years. Johns-Manville, 36 B.R. at 729. 
By contrast, SGL Carbon faces a known and finite number 
of suits. In addition, the Johns-Manville Court made clear 
that its decision was based on factors other than the 
debtor's financial health. Unlike this case, the Johns- 
Manville creditors pursued their motion only after sixteen 
months of bargaining over an acceptable reorganization 
plan resulted in a deadlock. In denying the creditors' 
motion to dismiss, the court stated it would "bear in mind 
the strategical motivations underlying [creditors'] pursuit of 
these motions at this time" and would recognize"the 
progress toward a successful, perhaps consensual, 
reorganization that has already taken place." Id. at 731. 
The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors here did not 
delay in filing the motion to dismiss SGL Carbon's Chapter 
11 petition; nor does SGL Carbon allege the creditors' 
motion was spurred by an intent to extract concessions in 
stalled negotiations. This case, therefore, involves neither 
the creditors' "strategical motivations" nor the "progress 
towards a successful . . . reorganization" that colored the 
Johns-Manville Court's opinion. Id. 
 
Based on the facts and circumstances of this case, we 
conclude SGL Carbon's Chapter 11 petition lacks a valid 
reorganizational purpose and consequently lacks good faith 
making it subject to dismissal "for cause" under 11 U.S.C. 
S 1112(b).23 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
23. Because we conclude SGL Carbon's petition should be dismissed, we 
need not address the creditors' argument that the failure to dismiss 
would deprive it of its Seventh Amendment right to try its antitrust 
claims before a jury. 
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C. 
 
In reaching our conclusion, we are cognizant that it is 
growing increasingly difficult to settle large scale litigation. 
See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S.Ct. 2295 (1999); 
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). We 
recognize that companies that face massive potential 
liability and litigation costs continue to seek ways to rapidly 
conclude litigation to enable a continuation of their 
business and to maintain access to the capital markets. As 
evidenced by SGL Carbon's actions in this case, the 
Bankruptcy Code presents an inviting safe harbor for such 
companies. But this lure creates the possibility of abuse 
which must be guarded against to protect the integrity of 
the bankruptcy system and the rights of all involved in 
such proceedings. Allowing SGL Carbon's bankruptcy 
under these circumstances seems to us a significant 
departure from the use of Chapter 11 to validly reorganize 
financially troubled businesses. 
 
IV. 
 
For the reasons stated, we will reverse the judgment of 
the District Court and remand to the District Court so that 
it may dismiss SGL Carbon's Chapter 11 petition. 
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